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Garlepp: Baxter v. Cobe: Public Use or Secret Prior Art?

BAXTER V. COBE: PUBLIC USE OR SECRET
PRIOR ART?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Patent Clause of The United States Constitution provides
that "[tihe Congress shall have Power.. . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries. " ' Congress
responded by enacting The Patent Statute,2 which envisions a quid
pro quo whereby society, through the federal government, offers an
inventor a monopoly of limited duration in his invention in return
for full disclosure of the inventor's discovery. Through such patent
agreements, the public obtains knowledge of inventions, which in
turn fosters technological advancement for the economic and
cultural benefit of all. Likewise, the inventor benefits from the
patent grant by securing an economic monopoly in his or her
invention. If an invention has been disclosed to society through its
use, however, the patent grant becomes unnecessary to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. Congress included section
102(b)3 in its enactment of the current patent statute to account
for such "public use."
Courts have struggled to develop a Public Use Doctrine that
defines what uses of an invention constitute enough public
disclosure that the disclosure of the patent system was unnecessary.4 A narrow definition of public use allows fewer "public"
activities to invalidate a patent, while a broad definition of public
use may strip inventors of their patents too easily. The courts'
definition of public use must find the optimum balance that ensures
public disclosure of new inventions, but avoids unnecessarily
granting economic monopolies that our free market society so abhors.

'U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 100-105 (1994)).
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
See William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffman III, Reduction to Practice,
Experimental Use, and the 'On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars to Patentability,63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1 (1988) (mapping the wavering development of the public use doctrine in pre and
post Federal Circuit cases).
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In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,5 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined public use too
broadly. This Recent Development examines how the Baxter court
strayed from precedent and Congressional intent to broaden the
scope of public use and failed to give proper weight to the policy of
public disclosure. The Recent Development further argues that
such a broad scope of public use makes inventors more likely to
forego the patent monopoly for more secretive means of exploiting
their invention, thereby diminishing exposure of new technology to
the public and impeding the progress of science and useful arts.
II.BACKGROUND
In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,6 the
Federal Circuit found that the use of a centrifuge by a research
doctor in his personal laboratory was a public use and therefore
invalidated the patent later obtained by an independent inventor
of a similar centrifuge.7 In holding that private laboratory
research use was public use under section 102(b) of the patent
statute,8 the court defined the outer boundary of the Public Use
Doctrine as a bar to patentability.9
Baxter International, Inc. was the patent holder on a sealless
centrifuge for separating blood into its components.1" The application for patent was filed on May 14, 1976 and therefore had a
critical date" of May 14, 1975 for purposes of 35 U.S.C. section
102(b). 12 The alleged prior public use of the patented invention
88 F.3d 1054, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6 Baxter International, Inc. was joined in the suit by Baxter Healthcare Corporation.
Both7 companies are collectively referred to as "Baxter" throughout this Note. Id. at 1056.
5

1d.

at 1054.

8 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
'Baxter Intl, Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
10Id. at 1061. Baxter was the assignee of patent 4,734,089, which was assigned by
inventor Herbert Cullis. Id.
"1 The "critical date" is the date before which public use of an invention will bar
patentability of that invention. See generally WORDS AND PHRASES, 10A (1968) (defining
"critical" and "criticality" in the patent context).
12 Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1056. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) reads: "A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless... the invention was ... in public use.., in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States...." Thus, the "critical
date" is set at one year before the filing of the patent.
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involved the independent activities of Dr. Jacques Suaudeau, a
research scientist for the National Institute of Health (NIH). 13 Dr.
Suaudeau was studying isolated heart preservation by perfusion,"
which required the separation of platelet rich plasma from whole
blood."' The centrifuge that Suaudeau had been using to accomplish separation of the blood was damaging platelets in the blood
due to the rotating seals of the centrifuge. 16 In an attempt to
obtain the platelet rich blood needed, Suaudeau began using a
sealless centrifuge 7 similar to the one later independently developed and claimed in the Baxter patent. 8
After finding that the centrifuge worked to separate blood into its
components, Suaudeau continued to perform laboratory experiments with the centrifuge to determine if it could produce the
platelet rich plasma required for perfusion. 9 This testing occurred before the critical date in Suaudeau's laboratory at NIH in
Bethesda, Maryland.2 ° Neither Suaudeau nor the inventor of his
device had any contact or connection with the inventor named in
the Baxter patent.2 '
In 1995, Baxter sued Cobe Laboratories, Inc. for infringement of
several claims of the Baxter centrifuge patent.2 2 The district court

13

4

Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1056.

Perfusion involves the pumping of both whole blood and separated platelet rich plasma
through a heart as a means of preserving the organ during heart operations. Id.
'5Id.
16 Id.

17 The device used by Suaudeau was designed by Dr. Yoichiro Ito, who was also a
research scientist at NIH. Dr. Suaudeau had the centrifuge built by the NIH machine shop
in accordance with Ito's drawings. Id.
'8 Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058.
19Id. at 1056.

Id. The Federal Circuit based its finding of public use solely on the experiments at
NIH and therefore did not address whether Suaudeau's laboratory use at Massachusetts
General Hospital, where he subsequently obtained a job, was public use under § 102(b). Id.
at 1060.
21 Id. at 1056. See supra notes 10 and 17 (Herbert M. Cullis was the inventor of
the
Baxter centrifuge and Dr. Yoichiro Ito was the inventor of the centrifuge used at NIH).
' Baxter asserted infringement of claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 9-11, 13, 17, 25, and 26 of the Baxter
patent. Both parties stipulated that a validity resolution of three representative claims
would apply to all other infringement claims. The Baxter majority found the pertinent parts
of the representative claims to be as follows:
10. A centrifugal blood processing apparatus for use in conjunction with
a flow system including at least one blood processing chamber and a
flexible umbilical cable segment having a plurality of integral passage-
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granted Cobe's motion for summary judgment and found that
Baxter's representative patent claims were invalid.'
Over the
dissent of Judge Newman, Judge Lourie wrote for the Federal
Circuit panel to affirm the district court findings that Suaudeau's
use of the similar centrifuge24 at the NIH laboratory was nonexperimental public use that occurred before the critical
date.'
27
As such, the majority26 held the Baxter patent invalid.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRcuIT's ANALYSIS IN BAXTER
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION

The first issue addressed by Judge Lourie was whether Suaudeau's research activities at NIH constituted public use under section
102(b) of the patent act.' The court defined public use as "any
use of [the claimed] invention by a person other than the inventor
who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the
ways for establishing fluid communication with said blood processing
chamber, said apparatus comprising, in combination: ...
17. The method of centrifugally processing biological fluid with reduced
risk of contamination of the fluids of the outside environment using a
closed leak-proof envelope which envelope includes an umbilical having
input and output at one side thereof and defining passageways there
through, which umbilical includes a flexible segment which is capable of
repeated axial twisting and untwisting, and which envelope also includes
at least one processing chamber connected at the other side of the
umbilical which chamber is in communication with the passageway
thereof, comprising the steps of: ...

25. A disposable flow system for use in processing fluids in a centrifugal
apparatus of the type having a stationary base, an orbiting assembly
mounted to the base for orbiting about an axis at a first rotational speed,
and a centrifugating rotor assembly for revolving about said axis at twice
the rotational speed of said orbiting assembly, said unit comprising: ...
Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1056-57.
23 Id. See Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 879, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1123, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Where the parties stipulate to 'representative' claims, ... a
validity resolution for the representative claims applies to the other claims as well").
2 Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058 (Federal Circuit adopting findings of the district court in
holding that "[t]he [Suaudeau centrifuge] met all the limitations of the representative claims
of the [Baxter] patent").
2Id.
26

at 1057.

Judge Schall joined as the majority. Id. at 1056.

at 1061.
' Baxter Intl, Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2Id.
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inventor."29 Judge Lourie found that the totality of the circumstances, in light of the underlying policies of the public use
doctrine, brought Suaudeau's use within such definition despite
Baxter's argument that the use at NIH was not publicly known or
accessible.30
The majority declared the controlling policy to be that of
discouraging removal from the public domain of inventions that the
public has come to believe are freely available. 31 It found significant the record's showing of free flow into Suaudeau's lab of people
not bound by an obligation of confidentiality3 2 after the centrifuge
was reduced to practice3 3 and determined that these circumstances would lead those who witnessed the invention reasonably to
believe that the invention was publicly available.'
After characterizing Suaudeau's laboratory use as public use, the
court next addressed the issue of whether the use was experimental, thereby negating a finding of public use under section
102(b).3 ' The majority adopted the district court finding that
Suaudeau was not experimenting with the basic features of the
invention, but was only fine tuning the centrifuge for his own
particular use.36 It found significant the fact that Suaudeau
conducted his research after the centrifuge was reduced to practice
and that Suaudeau was not under the control 37 of the inventor of

Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058 (citing In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 218 U.S.P.Q. 976 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
30

Id. at 1058.

3

1d.

1

32 The court rejected Baxter's argument that ethical constraints would have limited or
precluded those who saw the centrifuge in operation from disclosing their knowledge of it.

Id. at 1059.
' "Reduction to practice" is the stage in the inventive process when the invention has
been embodied in its physical or tangible form and works for its intended purpose. See
Rooklidge and von Hoffman, supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining the terminology used in public
use cases).
34 Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058-59.
36 Id. at 1059-60.
3
1Id. at 1060.
" The court reasoned that experimental use as a negation of the public use bar is
intended to allow an inventor sufficient time to test his or her own invention before applying
for a patent. Since Suaudeau's laboratory testing at NIH was completely independent of the
inventor of the Baxter device, Baxter could not rely on such testing to argue experimental
use and avoid the public use bar. Id.
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the Baxter centrifuge.' The court thus concluded that the totality
of the circumstances indicated that Suaudeau's use was both public
and non experimental under section 102(b), thereby invalidating
the Baxter patent.3 9
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Newman disagreed with the majority's finding of public
use under section 102(b) and would have held that Suaudeau's use
was "secret use," which could not invalidate Baxter's patent on the
later independently developed centrifuge.40 She argued that Dr.
Suaudeau's private laboratory research use was unknown and
unknowable and could not have been discovered by painstaking
documentary research. 4' As such, Judge Newman found that a
holding of public use under these circumstances was not supported
by precedent and was contrary to the intended
meaning of "public
42
use" in section 102(b) of the patent act.
Judge Newman first argued that the majority decision was
unsupported by precedent. 43 She declared that a finding of public
use in Baxter was an unwarranted leap from the majority's
supporting case,4 4 which held that public testing of an invention
with over two hundred consumers barred patentability under
section 102(b).4 5 Moreover, Judge Newman argued, the majority's
emphasis on reduction to practice in the public use analysis was
also unwarranted.4" She characterized the majority rule as a
finding that all use of a device after its reduction to practice was
ipso facto public use.4" This, Judge Newman argued, was new
law. 4'

Id. at 1059-60.
"Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1061.
'0Id. at 1061.
38

1

4 Id. at 1061-62.
42'd.

Id. at 1062.
"In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127.
Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1062.
"Id. In arguing against a finding of public use, Judge Newman assumed that the device
used by Suaudeau was reduced to practice. She noted that this assumption was strongly
challenged by Baxter and should not have been decided as factual on summary judgment.
Id. at
1061 n.1.
7
4 Id. at 1061.
4Id.
43
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The dissent next argued that a finding of public use was contrary
to the objective standards set forth in section 102"" of the patent
act.' She first put the case into context as not a case of patentee
defending against his own prior use to save his patent, but rather
a would be infringer asserting as a defense the invalidating prior
use of a similar device by an independent third party.5 1 Judge
Newman argued that without publication or filing of a patent, the
use was unknown and unknowable information in the hands of a
third party and therefore "secret prior art." The patent act, she
added, allowed such secret prior art to invalidate a patent only
under the circumstances of section 102(e) 52 of the patent statute.
Since the majority opinion did not rely on any publication or
prior patent as prior art and section 102(e) did not apply in this
case, Judge Newman concluded that the majority's finding of public
use based on Suaudeau's laboratory use created a new source of
unknown or unknowable grounds for invalidating a patent."
This, she argued, created unreliability of the patent grant.55
IV. THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
Section 102(b) of the United States patent statute provides that
a person shall be entitled to a patent on his or her invention unless
"the invention was.., in public use.., in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States."'
The Supreme Court set out the framework for determining what
activities constitute public use in an early case involving a woman's
use, before the critical date,5 7 of a corset invented by her hus4' 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
50

Baxter, 88 F.3d 1061-62.

5'Id. at 1061.

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1994) provides that the information contained in a patent
application, while secret while the application is pending, becomes invalidating prior art as
of the filing date when the patent is granted. See infra note 102.
3Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1062.
52

"Id.

Id.

at 1063.
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
67 The applicable statute in this case set the critical date at two years prior to filing for
patent. See The Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §
102 (1994)).
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band." Despite the fact that the corset was at all times concealed
from public view by overgarments, the Court held that the wearing
was public use within the meaning of the statute because the
inventor imposed no obligation of secrecy or other restrictions on
his wife.5 9
The Second Circuit further construed section 102(b) when it
considered whether a third party's activity constituted public use
so as to invalidate a subsequent independent inventor's patent on
The court held that while the third party's
a similar device.'
quilting machine was substantially similar to the subsequent
patentee's, the use by the third party was "secret use" that could
not invalidate the patentee's claims on his quilt machine.6 1 In
finding that the prior inventor actively concealed his invention, the
Second Circuit reasoned that the means of obtaining knowledge of
the invention were not within the public's reach.6 2 Judge Learned
Hand, writing for the panel, adopted the reasoning of an early
Supreme Court public use case in stating, "that which3 had not
enriched the arts should not count [to defeat a patent]."
With the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982, 64 the new
and independent appellate court inherited the inconsistent and
often contradictory precedents among the several circuits and the
Supreme Court as to what activities constitute public use. 65 The
court diminished confusion" of the public use doctrine by consis-

Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881). During a portion of the public use period,
the woman wearing the corset was merely an intimate friend of the inventor. After the
couple married, the inventor patented the corset springs and subsequently died. His wife
brought an infringement suit against manufacturers of corsets similar to that of her
husband's, which had become widely produced during the woman's interim use. Id. at 335.
9Id. at 337.
0 Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (2d Cir. 1940).
6' Id. at 31.
2Id.

"Id. (discussing Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850), which held a patent
valid despite the fact that the patentee's improvements had been previously invented and
used by others since knowledge of such invention was not available to the public).
" The Federal Courts Improvement Act created the new Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(aX1), (aX4) (1994).
"See Rooklidge & von Hoffman, supra note 4 (noting that two fundamentally different
understandings of the public use bar had developed prior to the establishment of the Federal
Circuit).
See Edward G. Poplawski and Paul D. Tripodi II, The Impact of Federal Circuit
Precedent on the "On Sale" and "PublicUse" Bars to Patentability,44 AM. U. L. REV. 2351
(1995) (arguing that the Federal Circuit diminished confusion of pre Federal Circuit cases
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tently employing a test that considered the totality of circumstances
in light of four stated policies that defined the boundaries of the
public use doctrine:67 (1) to discourage removal of inventions from
the public domain that the public has come to believe are freely
available (also called avoidance of detrimental public reliance); (2)
to favor prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the
public; (3) to allow inventors a reasonable amount of time following
sales activity to determine the economic value of their patents; and
(4) to prohibit inventors from commercially exploiting inventions
beyond the statutorily prescribed period.'
The Federal Circuit early addressed the issue of public use in the
case of W.L. Gore and Associates v. Garlock Inc.,89 where a patented process for stretching Teflon was held valid notwithstanding the
use by an independent third party of a similar process before the
critical date.7 ° The court found the activities of the third party to
be "secret" and not public use despite the fact that the machine
employing the patented process was displayed to persons not bound
by a secrecy agreement.7 ' Noting testimony that the parties
viewing the machine could not thereby learn anything about the
process under patent, the court reasoned that the viewing did not
make knowledge of the claimed process accessible to the public.7 2
In upholding the patent, the Federal Circuit found that the policy
of public disclosure, as the "linchpin of the patent system," required
favoring the later publicly disclosed patent over prior use that
did
73
not make knowledge of the process available to the public.

by adopting the totality of the circumstances in light of underlying public use policies test).
' See General Elec. Co. v. U.S., 654 F.2d 55, 61, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, (Ct. Cl. 1981)
(en banc) (per curiam) (noting the consistency of the Federal Circuit in adhering to the four
public use policies). See also Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., 917 F.2d 544, 549-50,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d.
1571, 1574, 15 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (both considering the totality of the
circumstances in light of the four policies.).
' General Elec., 654 F.2d at 61.
70 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1549-50.
71 This case involved active concealment by use of a secrecy agreement between the
machine user's company, its employees, and the inventor. The machine was also shown to
employees of an independent interested company (i.e. Du Pont corporation) who were not
bound by the secrecy agreement. Id.
7Id.

73

Id. at 1549.
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In Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.,"' the Federal Circuit
again considered the issue of public use where an inventor openly
displayed his three dimensional cube puzzle on the desk in his
office before the critical date.75 The court held this display not to
be public use despite the free flow of people into the inventor's
office and his surrendering possession of the invention to a third
party for marketing purposes.7 6 Characterizing the inventor's use
as private and for his own personal enjoyment, the court explicitly
held that the presence or absence (as in this case) of an expressed
confidentiality agreement was not dispositive of a finding of public
use.77 The court reasoned that the personal relationship between
the inventor and those who had access to his device prevented the
use from being unrestricted. The use was therefore held not public
under section 102(b).78
The Federal Circuit also adopted the pre-Federal Circuit
judicially created doctrine of experimental use. 79 Experimental
use serves as an exception to the public use doctrine in that it
"negates" a finding of public use in circumstances that would
otherwise be considered public use under section 102(b).80 In
determining whether an inventor's use is experimental, the Federal
Circuit employs the familiar "totality of circumstances in light of
public use policies" test. 8 ' The main policy underlying the experi74 793 F.2d. 1261, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77Id.
78

at 1265.
at 1266.

Id.

" A discussion of public use is not complete without acknowledging the doctrine of
experimental use, which serves to "negate" public use. The Federal Circuit found the
invalidating use in Baxter to be non-experimental. This Recent Development challenges the
majority's characterization of Suaudeau's use as "public use," which necessitated its inquiry
into the experimental use exception. Therefore, the doctrine of experimental use is not given
in-depth analysis. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's impact on the doctrine of
experimental use, see William C. Rooklidge & Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity
and Experimental Use Negation of the Public Use and On Sale Bars To Patentability,29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1995).
' Baxter Intl, Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Experimental
use negates public use; when proved, it may show that particular acts, even if apparently
public in the colloquial sense, do not constitute a public use within the meaning of section
102").
81 Factors in determining if a use is experimental include: (1) the length of the test
period; (2) whether the inventor received payment for the testing; (3) any agreement by the
user to maintain confidentiality; (4) any records of testing; (5) whether a person other than
the inventor performed the testing; (6) the number of tests; and (7) the length of the test

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss2/5

10

Garlepp: Baxter v. Cobe: Public Use or Secret Prior Art?

1997]

BAXTER V. COBE

mental use exception is to allow the inventor to reduce his
invention to practice before filing for patent.8 2 This furthers the
public interest by ensuring that inventions disclosed through the
patent system have been perfected.'
V. ANALYSIS
The Baxter majority erred in holding that private laboratory use
of a device reduced to practice is "public use" that invalidates a
subsequent patentee's claims on an independently developed
similar device.'
This holding improperly broadens the scope of
public use and fails to give proper weight to the policy favoring
public disclosure of new inventions. As such, the majority ruling
creates unfairness and unreliability of the patent system, making
inventors more likely to forego the patent monopoly for trade secret
protection of their inventions. This disincentive created by the
Baxter ruling diminishes disclosure of new technology to the public
thereby impeding the constitutional purpose of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts.
The Baxter majority frustrated Federal Circuit precedent and
Congressional intent by broadening the scope of invalidating public
use to include activities unknown or unknowable to the public. The
court first strayed from precedent by reviving an outdated legal
definition of public use that emphasized confidentiality of the prior
use. The majority opinion rested on a definition of public use as
"any use of [the claimed] invention by a person other than the
inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of
secrecy to the inventor."'
This broad definition however, had
been significantly diminished by subsequent Federal Circuit rulings

period in relation to tests of similar devices. Id. at 1060 (citing TP Labs., Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 at 971-72, 220 U.S.P.Q. 577 at 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
0' ROOKLIDGE & JENSEN supra note 79, at 22. See also City of Elizabeth v. American
Nicholson Paving Co. 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) ("The use of an invention by the inventor
himself, or any person under his direction, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the
invention to perfection, has never been regarded as [a public use]").
Id.
s Baxter Intl, Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1058 (emphasis added) (citing In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which cited Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881), in
forming its definition of public use.).
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which retreated from the focus on confidentiality in public use
cases.
The Federal Circuit first indicated its retreat from the majority's
cited definition in the case of W.L. Gore and Associates v. Garlock,
87
Inc.," which involved the prior use of an independent inventor.
While Gore involved use by parties to a secrecy agreement, the
machine employing the patented process at issue was also displayed to employees of an interested company not bound by such
agreement.'
Significantly, the Gore court held this use was
"secret use" which did not invalidate the later patent despite the
absence of a secrecy obligation. 9
The emphasis on confidentiality was more significantly reduced
by the court in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.,90 involving
prior use by the patentee and his colleagues.91 In acknowledging
that no party who witnessed the inventor's cube puzzle was bound
to secrecy, the court explicitly held that lack of an express confidentiality agreement is not determinative to public use. 92 While the
court reasoned that the inventor's personal relationship with those
who freely used the puzzle prevented the use from being unrestricted,93 the holding effectively diminished the focus on confidentiality
that is inherent in the Baxter majority's definition.94 The majority
failed to consider either Moleculon or Gore when it revived a

887 721 F.2d 1540
88

(Fed. Cir. 1983).

d&

Id. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

" Id.
90 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
91Id.

Id. at 1266 (citing TP Laboratories, Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,
972, 220 U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir.)).
9Id.
9 The majority definition owes its roots to the early Supreme Court case of Egbert v.
Lippmann. See supra note 85. Although the use in Egbert was that of an intimate friend
who later married the inventor, the Court held that the use was under "no restrictions" and
therefore invalidated the patent. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337. The Moleculon court distinguished
Egbert, reasoning the "personal relationship" between the cube invention and his friends and
colleagues prevented their use from being unrestricted. Since the marital relationship in
Egbert is arguably far more personal than the relationship in Moleculon, the Moleculon
court's rationale diminishes the significance of confidentiality to the public use analysis by
allowing user-inventor relationships to easily be characterized as confidential. It is not
insignificant that the Supreme Court acquiesced to this deviation from Egbert by denying
certiorari in Moleculon. CBS, Inc. v. Moleculon Research Corp., 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
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definition of public use that predated both cases.
Moleculon and Gore also reveal the unprecedented weight that
the majority placed on "reduction to practice" in broadening the
scope of public use. Employing the totality of the circumstances
test, the majority revealed three circumstances that led to its
finding of public use: (1) free flow of people into the lab where the
centrifuge was being used; (2) lack of an obligation to confidentiality; and (3) the device used had been reduced to practice.9" The
free flow of people into the cube inventor's office in Moleculon is
directly analogous to the free flow of people into Suaudeau's lab in
Baxter, yet the majority parted with the Moleculon court in finding
public use. Similarly, the Baxter court's reliance on the lack of a
secrecy agreement was colored by both Moleculon and Gore which,
as previously discussed, found use not to be public despite lack of
such an agreement. With these two circumstances undercut by
Federal Circuit precedent, the majority ruling is left to stand
largely upon its finding that Suaudeau's device was reduced to
practice.
The majority offered no cases supporting this addition of
reduction to practice to the public use analysis which, as the
dissent properly declared, amounts to a holding that all laboratory
use of a device is public use as soon as the device is reduced to
practice. 96 Since reduction to practice merely defines a stage in
the inventive process,9 7 a fact independent of exposure of the
invention to the public, the majority rule allows a finding of public
use without regard to whether the use discloses knowledge of the
invention to the public. As such, the majority's addition of
reduction to practice to the public use analysis is not only new law,
but is contrary to Congressional intent that public use be that
which makes the invention known to the public.
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended prior art,
under which public use falls, to be that which was "known before
as described in section 102. "9 The Supreme Court acknowledged
this general rule when it carved out an exception for pending

Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058-59.

Id. at 1062.
97See supra note 33.
"H.R. Rep. No. 82. 1923, 2d Sess. 7 (1952) (emphasis added).
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patent applications.9 9 The Court held that patents pending at the
patent office can act as prior art for subsequent inventions even
though such applications are kept secret."° The Supreme Court
reasoned that while secret information generally will not invalidate
a patent, the delay of the patent application process should not
defeat the prior applicant's filing date.1"' In later codifying this
exception for "secret prior art" in section 102(e), °2 Congress
effectively confirmed that section 102(b) public use is that which
makes the invention known or knowable to the public. 1 3 This
meaning of section 102(b) is frustrated by Baxter's outdated
emphasis on confidentiality and new reduction to practice analysis,
which broaden the scope of public use to include unknown and
unknowable activities. Judge Newman properly declared this
expansion of public use as "dramatically new law."'1 4
In expanding the scope of public use, the Baxter court also failed
to give proper weight to the policy favoring public disclosure of new
inventions. The Federal Circuit has properly described public
disclosure as the "linchpin of the patent system,"'0 5 for it is the
primary means of advancing the constitutional purpose of promoting the progress of science. 106 Of the four underlying policies of
public use frequently cited by the Federal Circuit,' 7 the majority
found the controlling policy to be that against removing inventions
from the public that the public has come to believe are freely
available.0 8 While the majority was correct in excluding from its

9 Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926). See also
Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 254, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429, 431 (1965)
(holding that pending patent applications are prior art for purposes of determining section
103 obviousness).
100 Id. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994) requires the Patent Office to keep patent applications
secret unless the Commissioner determines that there are special circumstances.
101Id.
102

35 U.S.C. 102(e) (1994): "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention

was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent....
103 See Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1061 ("[majority's holding] creates a new and mischievous
category of 'secret' prior art" in section 102(b) public use) (Newman, J., dissenting).
'4 Id. at 1063.
1'0 Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550.
106
See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
107See

supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text.

'os Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1058.
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analysis those policies inapplicable to third party situations, it was
incorrect in excluding the policy favoring prompt and wide spread
disclosure of inventions to the public. Consideration of this policy
is integral to a public use analysis and is dispositive when the use
is that of an independent third party.
When the prior use at issue is that of the patentee trying to
uphold his patent, the Federal Circuit's four policy analysis seeks
to advance public disclosure while preventing the inventor from
abusing the patent system. A patentee who first exploits his
invention and later obtains a patent on that invention effectively
extends the patent monopoly by the time of his exploitation.
Section 102(b) allows this exploitation for only one year before
requiring full disclosure through the patent system."° Where a
patentee exploits his invention for more than one year, a finding of
public use may be necessary to prevent abuse of the patent system
despite the fact that such use disclosed little about the invention to
the public.
For an inventor who does not actively exploit his invention
however, the policy of public disclosure should favor a finding of no
public use. Such an inventor who later discloses his invention
through the patent system should not have his personal use before
the critical date invalidate his patent. This conclusion is inherent
in the Moleculon decision where the cube inventor's non-exploiting
use before the critical date was characterized as "personal and for
his own enjoyment" and therefore non-invalidating. 110
Thus,
where the use at issue is that of the patentee's, the policy favoring
disclosure of new inventions should be diminished only to the
extent that it prevents an inventor from abusing the patent system
by extending the patent monopoly.
When the use at issue is that of an independent third party,
public disclosure becomes dispositive of a finding of no public use
because the policies preventing a patentee from extending his

109
By setting the critical date at one year prior to the patent application, section 102(b)
allows the extension of the patent grant by one year. See supra note 12. This effectuates
the Federal Circuit's public use policy of allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time
to determine the economic value of his invention before incurring the expense of patenting
it.
"o Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1261.
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monopoly are inapplicable."l ' In the Baxter situation, where an
inventor neither exploits his invention nor patents it, and a
subsequent inventor independently develops and patents a similar
device, the law should favor the subsequent inventor who disclosed
the invention. 112 Allowing an independent party's use that does
not achieve the widespread disclosure of the patent system to
invalidate a subsequent patent leaves society wanting of the
benefits it can receive through the patent system. 1 ' In finding
that Dr. Suaudeau's private lab use made the Baxter invention
"freely available" to the public, the majority failed to consider the
prompt and widespread public disclosure achieved by the Baxter
patent. In doing so, the majority overlooked the importance of
public disclosure of new inventions to the constitutional purpose of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Indeed, the
majority ruling is likely to diminish such disclosure and thereby
impede the progress of science.
By broadening the scope of public use, the Baxter decision creates
unfairness and uncertainty in the patent system and makes
inventors more likely to forego patent protection for more secretive
means of exploiting their inventions. As Judge Newman's dissent
noted, a broad definition of public use will lead to invalidating

...
The policy allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity
to determine the economic value of a patent and the policy prohibiting the inventor from
commercially exploiting the invention beyond the statutorily prescribed period are
inapplicable when the invalidating use is that of a third party. By definition, an independent
subsequent patentee cannot determine the value of his patent nor extend his statutory
monopoly by the use of an unknown prior inventor. See generally Harris A. Pitlick, 'On
Sale" Activities of an Independent Third Party Inventor, Or--Whose Widget is it?, 64 J. OF
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 138 (March 1982) (arguing that these same policies, used by the Federal
Circuit in "on sale" bar cases, are inapplicable to independent third party sales).
" 2 See Gore, 721 F.2d at 1540 ("As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process
by selling its product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the
public, and a later inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public
will gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter"). While this analysis
presumes active concealment by the prior inventor, it indicates the Federal Circuit's
willingness to favor the full disclosure of the patent system over prior uses resulting in
minimal disclosure of an invention to the public.
"s See Thomas G. De Jonghe, When is Commercial Use a 102(b) Bar?, 51 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 706 (1969) (arguing that only use by third parties which makes an
invention accessible to the public at large should be considered "public use" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)).
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"public" uses that are incapable of discovery by inventors." 4 A
patentee therefore is now less sure that his patent will not be
invalidated by earlier unknown and unknowable use of a similar
device. While such unreliability may be justified for pending
patents since disclosure is delayed only by Patent Office backlog," 5 the unreliability is unjustified to strip the patentee, who
expends money to disclose his invention to the public, of the
economic benefit of his monopoly. Moreover, by allowing use which
is unknown to the public to be invalidating public use, the majority
rule creates a trap for unwary inventors who patent their inventions only to have their own personal prior use invalidate the
patent.
Such unreliability and unfairness makes the patent grant less
attractive to inventors faced with the significant expense of
obtaining a patent." 6 The inventor after Baxter is thus more
likely to choose trade secret protection for his invention and
prevent the dissemination of the invention's technical information
that the patent system provides. By depriving those skilled in the
arts of such up to date technical information, the progress of
science and useful arts, which fosters industrial growth for the
benefit of society, is likely to be impeded." 7
VI. CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit erred in holding that private laboratory use
of an invention after the invention is reduced to practice constitutes
invalidating "public use" under section 102(b). In so holding, the
Baxter court defined public use too broadly and failed to give proper
weight to the public policy favoring prompt and widespread

Baxter, 88 F.3d at 1062.
n See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
114

16

See Boston's Nutter, McClennen & Fish Last Month Initiated a Novel Seminar Program
to Reduce the Cost of Obtaining a Patent 9 No. 24 OF COUNSEL 14 (1990) ("the cost of patents
has risen so high that companies have taken to limiting the number of applications they file
...See Trajtenberg, A Penny For Your Quotes:

Patent Citations and the Value of

Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON 172 (1990) (indicating the importance of the patent system's
disclosure of new technology to those skilled in the arts by showing a correlation between the
economic value of a patent and the number of times the patent is cited by subsequent patent
documents).
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disclosure of new inventions to the public. This broadened scope of
public use creates unfairness and uncertainty in the patent grant
by invalidating patents for "secret prior art" in the form of prior use
that is unknown and unknowable to the public. As such, the
Baxter decision should lead to diminished disclosure of new
inventions to the public and a resulting impediment to the progress
of science and useful arts as more inventors choose trade secret
protection over the patent grant.
EDWIN D. GARLEPP
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